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IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this court is based upon U.C.A. § 78-2-2 (4): The
Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over
which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether the trial court erred in denying Plaintiffs claims for
alienation of affections and intentional infliction of emotional distress even
though the Plaintiff admitted that for purposes of summary judgment that her
complaint was filed within four years of when she discovered the source of
the alienation? Whether claims for intentional torts are barred by the Health
Care Malpractice Act?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
On review of a grant of summary judgment or a motion on the
pleadings treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 12, the
party against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the
facts presented and all the inferences fairly arising there from considered in
a light most favorable to her. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289
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259 P.2d 297 (1953). Moreover, the appellate court reviews conclusions of
law for correctness without according deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).

AUTHORITIES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
Plaintiff is unaware of any Utah cases that address the specific issue
of when a therapist's actions exceed the scope of their employment and
thereby shift the cause of action from a medical malpractice to an intentional
or negligent tort. However, Plaintiff relies of Lounsbury v. Capel, 191 Utah
Adv. Rep. 40(Ct. App. 1992) to show that the Utah Courts have recognized
that when a physician exceeds the scope of his employment a cause of action
for battery can result which is an intentional tort and not a mere cause of
action for negligence. In addition, Plaintiff also relies on cases from other
jurisdictions which further analyze this issue and state when a physician has
exceeded their medical malpractice insurer's liability. These authorities
included Mary Roe v. Federal Insurance Company, 587 N.E. 2d 214(1992)
and Marx v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 183 Neb. 12, 13(1968).
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In relation to the alienation of affection claim Plaintiff relies on
Norton v. MacFarlane, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, (Utah 1991) which address
the issue of when someone in a special position of trust like a professor or a
psychiatrists alienates ones spouse's affections from the other.

Norton

continues that Defendant's actions must be a controlling cause of the
marriage destruction.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff originally contacted Defendant in order to help counsel her
two daughters. Plaintiff and her spouse(James) would attend the meetings in
order to check on the progress of their children. Defendant began to develop
feelings for James to such a degree that she initiated an intimate relationship
with him prior to the filing of the divorce between Plaintiff and James.
James and Defendant were eventually married. Plaintiff alleges as a result
of Defendant's conduct her marriage greatly suffered to the point it was
destroyed thereby causing the tort of alienation of affection. Plaintiff also
alleges that Defendant's malicious conduct caused Plaintiff to suffer
emotional harm.
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At issue in this case is whether Defendant's conduct exceeded the
scope of her employment. Plaintiff would argue that Defendant conduct was
intentional and since the tort for alienation of affection does not require a
patient-therapist relationship, neither tort is covered by the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act. After Plaintiff filed her complaint, Defendant filed a
motion for Summary Judgment. The Trial Court, Honorable Sandra N.
Peuler presiding granted Defendant's motion for Summary Judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Apellee, Kathleen Bullen(Bullen) was a licensed clinical social
worker, engaged in: interviewing, counseling and/or providing
professional

therapy

with

respect

to

Appellant,

Suzanne

Dowling's(Dowling) family as a whole and to her daughters.
2. Dowling, acting upon BullenDs representations, reasonably believed
that Bullen was a therapist and/or professional counselor.
3. Bullen practiced with and was believed to be employed by, Canyon
Rim and Trolley Corners.
4. Dowling was married to James Anthony Hoagland, Jr., (James), and
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they resided in their marital home in Salt Lake City, Utah, with their
two(2) children prior to their divorce on September 26, 1996.
5. In December 1994, Dowling's two daughters began counseling with
Bullen.
6. In February 1995, Dowling, along with her two daughters and James,
began family counseling with Bullen. As a result of Bullen's position
as a special position of trust in the eyes of Dowling. The family or
various members of the family attended counseling with Bullen until
approximately June of 1996.
7. During that time, the two daughters continued therapy sessions with
Bullen, during which Bullen included Dowling in the last 1/3 of each
session.
8. During January 1996, James Hoagland filed a Petition for Divorce
from Dowling.
9. In February of 1996, one month after James filed for divorce, Bullen
suggested to Dowling seek another counselor, namely Susan
Culbertson.
10. On or about September 26, 1996, James was granted a divorce from
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Dowling over the objection of Dowling.
11. Near this same time, James and Bullen announced that they were
dating, and they were eventually married.
12. Dowling later learned that Bullen had initiated an intimate
relationship with James, prior to the filing of the petition for divorce.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
When reviewing the facts of this case it becomes clear that the trial
court erred in granting the Defendant's summary judgment motion. Under
either a motion to dismiss standard or a summary judgment standard the
Plaintiff's allegations in her complaint and affidavit, viewed in the light
most favorable to her, support several causes of action against the
Defendant.
On the Plaintiffs first claim of Alienation of Affection as well as the
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim, there are several material
issues of fact in dispute which, if proved, would allow a jury to find in the
Plaintiffs favor.
Thus, the decision of the trial court should be reversed and Plaintiff
should be allowed to proceed to discovery and submit her evidence to a jury.

6

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ALLOW
THE PLAINTIFF TO SHOW THAT SHE WAS NOT A
PATIENT OF THE DEFENDANT
The trial court refused to accept the fact that Plaintiff was not a patient

of the Defendant. Plaintiff attended various sessions to review the
progress of her children. When she would attend the last third of each
session, she was there to help the girls and not to receive counseling for
herself. Her presence can more closely by analogized with a parent
attending parent teacher-conferences then a patient-therapist relationship.
It should also be noted that all of the bills were in the daughter's names
and not the Plaintiffs.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO ACCEPT
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS THAT HER CLAIMS EXIST
INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY PATIENT-THERAPIST
RELATIONSHIP.

The tort of alienation of affections and intentional infliction of emotional
distress exists independently of any patient-therapist relationship. Neither of
the elements to prove the torts for alienation of affection or the intentional
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infliction of emotional distress require that there be a patient-therapist
relationship. In fact none of the Utah case law states that a patient-therapist
relationship is one of the elements to establish either of these two claims.
Plaintiffs claim could prevail even if she had never had contact with
Bullen in a therapy setting. This is because Plaintiffs claims do not stem
from any actions from Bullen as a therapist. Instead they relate back to
Defendant's intentional conduct to steal Plaintiffs husband and to cause
great emotional distress to Plaintiff.

III. INTENTIONAL TORTS ARE NOT PROTECTED BY THE
HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT AND THEREFORE
ARE NOT LIMITED TO THE TWO YEAR STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
The plaintiffs causes of action are intentional torts - they are not based
on a negligence theory and are thus not contingent on either 1) a doctorpatient relationship or 2) a special duty of care. In other words, these are
claims that may be brought regardless of the profession of the Defendant,
and they have a four-year statute of limitations.
Generally malpractice insurance does not cover intentional torts, but only
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torts committed in the scope of practice. Here the plaintiff was not the
patient of the defendant and was thus outside the scope of the doctor-patient
relationship. The best analogy is that if my doctor negligently drops a book
on my toe at church, I have a cause of action against him sounding in
negligence - with a four-year statute of limitations. If, on the other hand, he
removes the wrong lung in an operation, I have a malpractice claim, because
it was within the scope of treatment. It would be patently unfair to allow a
doctor a two year statute of limitations for all his or her actions simply
because he/she has a medical degree.
This distinction is recognized by the Utah Court of Appeals in
Lounsbury v. Capel 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 836 P.2d 188(Ct. App. 1992)
1992 Utah App. Lexis 123(1992)., in which it references a battery claim
against a physician based on lack of consent:
A battery is an intentional tort which, by definition, is not a cause of
action for negligence. A claim in battery or trespass may lie . . . where
an operation is performed without the patient's consent or where the
operation is not the surgical procedure to which the patient gave his
consent. By contrast, where the consent to the treatment was given but
with insufficient or incomplete disclosure of risks, the cause of action
is in medical malpractice based on negligence of the physician to meet
a recognized standard of care. Baltzell v. Van Buskirk, 752 S.W.2d
902, 906 (Mo. App. 1988).
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For further understanding of this point we must look to other
jurisdictions. The landmark case on defining what is professional services is
Marx v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 183 Neb. 12, 13(1968), coming
from the Supreme Court of Nebraska. The clearest interpretation of this case
and others of a similar ilk comes from California in Mary Roe v. Federal
Insurance Company, 587 N.E. 2d 214(1992) which began by reiterating the
Nebraska decision, "A medical malpractice insurer's liability is... limited to
the performing or rendering of professional acts or services. Something
more than an act flowing from mere employment or vocation is essential.
The act or service must be such as exacts the use or application of special
learning or attainments of some kind."
The California Court then further extrapolated on this case by
outlining four considerations. The most pertinent are the last two:
(3) that, when there is a complaint of malpractice, attention should
focus on the act or service performed rather than the fact that the
alleged wrongdoer was a physician or dentist because 'the scope of
professional services does not include all forms of a medical
professional's conduct simply because he or she is a doctor or dentist'
Niedzielski v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 134 N.H. 141, (1991)
and (4) that, to fall within the insuring language like that used here,
there must be a causal relationship between the alleged harm and
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complained-of professional act or service, that is, it must be a medical
or dental act or service that causes the harm, not an act or service that
requires no professional skill. Common sense of course, will always
provide a useful guide in differentiating covered from uncovered
cases."
When considering the facts it becomes apparent that the two
intentional torts committed by the Defendant were acts outside the scope of
her employment.
a. Alienation of Affection
The first tort to be considered is alienation of affection. The elements
of alienation of affection are: 1. the fact of marriage, 2. that the Defendant
willfully and intentionally 3. alienated the spouse's affections(Defendant's
acts must be the controlling cause and this must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence) 4. resulting in the loss of comfort, society and
consortium, 5. malice(to justify punitive damages). When reviewing the
elements it can clearly be established that the Defendant meets all the
requirements:
1. The fact of marriage.
Plaintiffs first encounter with Defendant was while she was still married.
Both Plaintiff and James were trying to make the marriage more successful.
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Since all marriages have high and low periods it is hard to gauge what
makes one marriage better than another one. The one fact that is clear is that
both Plaintiff and James wanted to stay married and were doing everything
in their power to make their marriage stronger.
2. That the Defendant willfully and intentionally,
3. Alienated the Spouse's affections(Defendant's acts must be the
controlling cause and this must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence.).
The Defendant knew that her actions would lead to the break up of the
marriage. She willfully and intentionally became involved with James,
knowing that this would alienate him from Plaintiff. Without Defendant's
third party intervention Plaintiff and Defendant would be in a different
situation today. The court has specifically addressed the issue of when
someone in a special power situation alienates one spouse's affections. In
Norton v. MacFarlane, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 818 P.2d 8(Utah 1991). The
defendant was the doctor of the plaintiff's wife. The court stated:
There are those in special positions of power, status, or authority who
may illicitly use sex to satisfy their own passions or for otherwise
improper ends. There are any number of such relationships, i.e.,
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professors and students; physicians and patients; psychiatrists,
psychoanalysts, or psychologists and clients; and employers and
employees. Those who use positions of power or authority for the
purpose of obtaining sexual favors and produce an alienation of
affections between the one in an inferior position and his or her spouse,
abuse and overreach any legitimate power they may have. In such cases,
the consequence may be not only the breakup of one or perhaps two
marriages, but also unforeseeable consequences in the future lives of the
children from such marriages. Nelson v. Jacobsen 669 P.2d 1207,
1222(Utahl983) (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting).
We do not now, however, make the existence of such a relationship a
necessary element in the proof of causation. We view the enumerated
relationships, and others in which one may improperly use power, status,
or authority to obtain improper and illicit sexual favors, as examples of
what can be evidence of causation. When such relationships exist and are
improperly exploited, the causation issue may be more easily resolved. It
is, however, possible that the "subordinate" party may also use the
relationship for his or her own ends. Certainly, the mere existence of such
a relationship does not suffice by itself to establish causation in an action
for alienation of affections, but it may be probative of the causation
element if the "superior" party abuses the relationship for illicit sexual
purposes. In any event, we make clear that the tort will lie, even if no
such power, status, or authority relationship exists.
Whether or not there is such a relationship, we hold that a plaintiff must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was the conduct of
defendant that constituted a controlling cause of the injury to a spouse's
consortium interests and that his or her conduct was not just incidental to
other causative factors that destroyed or damaged the marriage or
conjugal relationship. Norton v. Macfarlane 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 818
P.2d8(Utahl991).
4. Resulting in the loss of comfort, society and consortium.
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When reviewing the facts of this case it is clear that there can not be a
greater loss of comfort, society and consortium then the divorcing of two
parties. In addition, we must argue that the relationship was not severed
until the divorce became finalized, or in the alternative that there must be an
objective standard, in order to prevent Defendant from claiming that love
was lost years before. We may be able to argue that using the subjective
standard of the Defendant, is prejudicial to the Plaintiff, and does not
recognize the principle that it is when the Plaintiff is injured that the statute
of limitations begins to run. This rule is consistently applied in other areas
of tort law.
A court will seek to make the damages "proportionate" to the loss of the
injured spouse. On the issue of damages, the court will consider such factors
as the duration and quality of the marriage relation, including the extent to
which genuine feelings of love and affection existed between the spouses
prior to the intervention of the Defendant. Nelson v. Jacobsen 669 P.2d
1207,1222(Utah 1983). Here the Plaintiff must prove damages due to the
loss of the relationship. In this case, the Plaintiff has submitted a long list of
damages.
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5. Malice (to justify punitive damages).
In this case the malice arouse when Bullen put her needs before all those
around her. She was jealous of the relationship that she saw between
Dowling and James. This jealously caused her to act in an unethical manner
in that she stole someone else's husband. She had fallen in love with her
patient's father. She knew that any action on her part to form a relationship
with James would cause great emotional distress to Dowling.

a. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a
plaintiff must show that: 1. The conduct was outrageous and intolerable in
that it offended against the generally accepted standards of decency and
morality; 2. defendant intended to cause, or acted in reckless disregard of the
likelihood of causing, emotional distress; 3. plaintiff suffered severe
emotional distress; and 4. defendant's conduct proximately caused Plaintiffs
emotional distress. See Samms v. Eccles J 1 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 344,
346-47 (1961); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Utah Ct. App.
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1990U01 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 844 P.2d 949 cited by Retherford v. AT&T
Communications of Mt. States, Inc. (Utah 1992) 1992 Utah Lexis 120.

1. The conduct was outrageous and intolerable in that it offended against the
generally accepted standards of decency and morality
Here, the Defendant breached a rule of professional conduct. While
not dispositive of the issue, it a breach of professional conduct is evidence of
standards of decency and morality. The average person would find that
even on the most basic levels an affair with a married man breached the
commonly held moral standards.

2. Defendant intended to cause, or acted in reckless disregard of the
likelihood of causing, emotional distress
The Defendant entered her relationship with James with eyes wide
open. She is a licensed clinical social worker someone whose sole
employment purpose is to help people work on strengthening relationships
with others and with themselves. It is inconceivable that she was unaware of
the ramifications of her actions when she became involved with a married

16

man. Especially since she was clearly on a familiar basis with the wife and
children.
3. Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress
As a result of Defendant's actions Plaintiff has suffered tremendously.
In addition to loosing the companionship of a spouse. Her financial situation
is also very precarious. She has lost the companionship of having a spouse.
Instead of raising her children with a partner she must bare the emotional
and financial burden primarily alone.

4. Defendant's conduct proximately caused Plaintiff's emotional distress
Plaintiff was making every effort to save her marriage up until the
point that she learned that the Defendant had turned her husband against her.
Defendant's conduct was the gravamen in destroying the marriage between
Plaintiff and James. Before they met Defendant they were both trying to
work on improving their marriage.
The timing of when the tort occurs is different for emotional distress
than it is for alienation of affections. In Retherford (supra), the court stated:
Often, however, emotional distress does not so much occur as
unfold~for example, where a defendant subjects a plaintiff, not to a
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single outrageous act, but to a pattern or practice of acts tolerable by
themselves though clearly intolerable in the aggregate.... We have
been unable to locate authority that is directly on point concerning the
application of statutes of limitation to a pattern of conduct that
constitutes, in the aggregate, intentional infliction of emotional
distress. However, we find the treatment of claims of alienation of
affections instructive in this regard. In adjudicating such claims,
which often allege a series of wrongful acts over a substantial period
of time, courts have determined that the statute of limitations begins to
run when the alienation is accomplished, i.e., when love and affection
are finally lost. See e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 244 Ark. 327, 424 S.W.2d
871, 874 (Ark. 1968); Dobrient v. Ciskowski, 54 Wis. 2d 419, 195
N.W.2d449,451 (Wis. 1972); see also Flink v. Simpson, 49 Wash. 2d
639, 305 P.2d 803, 804 (Wash. 1957); Strode v. Gleason, 9 Wash.
App. 13, 510 P.2d 250, 254 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973). Applying this
standard by analogy, we hold that the statute of limitations for
intentional infliction of emotional distress does not begin to run until
the distress is actually inflicted, i.e., when the plaintiff suffers severe
emotional disturbance. Retherford v. AT&T Communications of Mt.
States, Inc. (Utah 1992) 1992 Utah Lexis 120.
IV. THE PLAINTIFF FILED HER CLAIMS WITHIN THE
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD.
The proper statute of limitations period for Alienation of Affections is
four years. Hodges v. Howell 4 P. 3d 803, 2000 Utah App. 171, 397 Utah
Adv. Rep 3 (Ct. App. 2000).
The statute of limitations for alienation of affections "begins to run
when alienation is accomplished i.e. when love and affection or finally lost."
Rutherford v. AT&T Communications 844 P. 2d 949 (Utah 1992). (That is
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a question of fact for the jury. Andreni v. Hultgreen 860 p. 2d 916, 919
(Utah 1993). See also Hodges v. Howell 4 P. 3d 803, 2000 Utah App. 171,
397 Utah Adv. Rep 3 (Ct. App. 2000). This has been defined as "the point at
which a person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal
injury").
In this case, the Plaintiff filed her complaint on September 25, 2000.
The divorce was granted over Suzanne's objection on September 26, 1996.
Thus we can argue that the Plaintiff filed this claim within four years of the
divorce becoming final. Which is the objective measure of when the
relationship was severed.
The proper statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional
distress is four years according to U.C.A. § 78-12-25.

CONCLUSION
The trial court's decision that Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment should be granted was fatally flawed for a number of reasons.
The first reason is the mere possibility that there was a patient-therapist
relationship does not automatically force the tort claim from one of an
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intentional tort to being encompassed by the broad penumbra of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act.
In addition the Court failed to take into consideration the fact that the
torts committed by Defendant far exceeded to scope of her profession.
Thereby preventing the torts from falling under the Malpractice Act.
The various cases of this jurisdiction and others that have more
closely addressed the issues at hand, show that it is possible to have a
medical profession exceed the scope of their profession and no longer be
covered by malpractice insurance. This fact alone should allow this case to
proceed past the Summary Judgment Motion.

DATED this 3

day of Qj/UU , 2002.

WINGO & RINEHART
Kathleen McConkie
Attorney for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM

06/04/02

11:12 FAX 8013732934

KINKOS OF PROVO

0002

-1IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SUZANNE DOWLING,

)

Plaintiff,

)

VS«

)

KATHLEEN BOWEN,

)

Defendant.

Case No. 000907667

)

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
October 28, 2002

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER
Third District Court Judge

For the Plaintiff:

KATHLEEN McCONKIE
Randle, Deamer, McConkie, Lee
139 East South Temple
Suite 330
Salt Lake Cityr Utah 64111
Telephone: (801)531-0441

For the Defendant:

PHIL FERGUSON
Christensen & Jensen
50 South Main Street
Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801)355-3472

Transcribed by:

Beverly Lowe CSR/CCT

1771 SOUTH CALIFORNIA AVENUE
PROVO, UTAH 84606
TELEPHONE: (801)377-0027

r/vA o u x o / o ^ a o *

KINKOS OF PRQVQ

•a

P R O C E E D I N G S
(Electronically recorded on October 29, 2002)
THE COURT: Good afternoon.
on the record.

Let me indicate we're

The matter before the Court at this time

is a hearing in the case of Dowling versus Bullen, case
No. 000907667, and I'll ask Counsel to state your appearances
for the record.
MS. McCONKIE: Kathleen McConkie, your Honor, appearing
on behalf of Ms* Dowling.
THE COURT; Thank you.
MR. FERGUSON; Phil Ferguson for the defense.
THE COURT: Thank you.

I did have an opportunity to

review the pleadings that you filed.

I did not —

although

I appreciate receiving copies of the cases, did not have an
opportunity to read any of the cases, so you might point out
if there's some that I maybe should have read.
Mr. Ferguson, if you would like to go ahead and start.
I just need to find a clean piece of paper before you start
talking to me.

Okay.

MR. FERGUSON: I hope your desk is cleaner than mine.
THE COURT: Pardon me?
MR. FERGUSON: I said I hope you can find one on your
desk.
THE COURT: I did actually just threw a bunch away.
hope I didn't need them.

I

-4MR, FERGUSON: As the Court undoubtedly knows, as
you've indicated having read the paperwork, this case involves
what I think is a relatively straightforward issue, and it's
primarily a legal issue.

That's whether an alienation of

affections claim that realizes in the context of a therapy
relationship is governed by the statute of limitations in the
medical malpractice act.
as we can put it.

I think that is about as succinctly

I don't think that there's any dispute over

the dates, or we're not taking issue at this stage at least
with the substance of the allegations.
The crucial base are that the plaintiff alleges that
my client destroyed her marriage by persuading her husband to
have sex with her sometime prior to January 1996; and that as a
consequence of that the husband filed a petition for divorce,
THE COURT: Is the January *96 date one of the dates
that was in the complaint?
MR. FERGUSON: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay.

I'm just trying to make sure I

remember where the dates came from.
MR. FERGUSON: Okay.

That's alleged in the complaint.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. FERGUSON: The divorce became final nine months
later in September, September the 26xh, 1996, and that is the
date that Ms. Dowling says she learned that the therapist had
been involved with her husband.

So the issue is whether if you

-5
use September the 26th, 1996 is the date of the beginning of
the statute of limitations, how long do you have before you
have to file your lawsuit.
this.

That's the easiest way to look at

There are arguments for using earlier dates.

That's

the latest date that's available to the plaintiff under the
complaint allegation to the Court.
Our position is pretty straightforward.
claim for therapist malpractice.

This is a

It's governed by the Utah

Healthcare Malpractice Act, which applies to therapists.

It

gives to plaintiff two years from the date that she knew or
should have known of the negligence and the harm to file a
case, and she alleges in her complaint that she knew on
September the 26fcS 1996 that my client had been negligent,
or as she puts it, actually intentionally interfered with
the marriage, and that the marriage in fact was destroyed.
So everything sort of points to September the 26th, 1996.
Under the statute she had two years.
expired September the 26th,
until September the 26th,
two years.

1998.
2000.

That two years

She didn't file anything

So she waited an additional

Under the plain language of the statute the case

is barred, and should be dismissed as to all of these I think.
THE COURT: Now, when are these —

I was wondering if

you should go through the complaint and tell me if there are
any causes of action as you look at them that you believe were
not covered by the two year statute of limitation,

I know that
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a proposed complaint was filed and I'm not dealing with that

2

yet, but the complaint that's on file.

3

MR. FERGUSON: No.

All of the allegations in the

4

complaint relate to or arise out of the therapy.

5

alleges disclosure of confidential information was obtained

6

in the therapy process.

7

process Ms. Bullen had sexual relations with her husband,

8

which was a breach of the duties that pertain to therapists,

9

specifically the code of ethics that applies to therapists,

Ms. Dowling

She alleges that during the therapy

10

and that she breached her fiduciary duty that she held as

11

a therapist to the family.

All of which are of course

12 malpractice allegations. There are no allegations in the
13

complaint that relate to anything other than malpractice.

14

They're all covered by the statute of limitations.

15

The one case that we cited that I think pretty well

16

analyzes the whole theoretical framework is the case of Jensen

17

versus IHC.

18

the essence of it is that a woman had a complicated pregnancy.

19

She went into the hospital for a C-section.

20

negligence in the course of that C-section she was rendered

21

unconscious and essentially totally disabled, and lived in a

22

persistent vegetative state for three-and-a-half years.

23

which point she died.

24
25

In that case —

it's a very complicated case, but

Due to some

At

During that three-and-a-half year period of time she
was transferred to a couple of different hospitals and there

Mimus
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-7was some intrigue by the lawyers and the doctors.

Within

two years after she died the family filed a lawsuit alleging
wrongful death and medical malpractice, as well as fraud or
covering up the claim.
The Supreme Court said, *This case is not governed
by the wrongful death statute.
malpractice statute."

It's governed by the medical

The family said, *Well, how can we sue

until she dies?

We should at least have two years from the

date she dies."

The Supreme Court said, *No, death isn't

the injury here.

The negligence that resulted in her being

comatose is the injury, and the statute of limitations begins
to run from that point."
So the cause of action for this medical malpractice
had expired before the patient actually passed awayf and tbe
Supreme Court said, *We will not allow a wrongful death cause
of action.

This is governed by the medical malpractice

statute
The family then says, '"Well, gee whiz, we didn't know
a lot of this stuff.
hospital.

It was covered up by the doctors in the

We've also filed a claim for general fraud."

The

Supreme Court said, ^Appreciate your creative thinking, but
fraud doesn't cut it-

It's covered by the medical malpractice

statute."
The medical malpractice statute has a provision in it
that allows for tolling in the event of fraud, and if you can

-81

prove your fraud then fine, the statute won't run, but you

2

don't get a different statute.

3

malpractice statute.

4

That's the one that we're going to apply.

5

try and prove fraud.

6

a case.

7

You get one statute, the

That's the one that governs your claim.
We'll allow you to

If you can't prove fraud, you don't have

That reasoning applies here.

There's no difference

8

between an alienation of affection claim and a wrongful death

9

claim or intentional infliction of emotional distress claim

10

or a breach of fiduciary duty claim.

They all arise in the

11

context of this medical malpractice.

They're all governed by

12

the Healthcare Malpractice Act.

13

should be dismissed.

14

The statute ran, and the case

There are other cases that we cite to that discuss

15

various aspects of the Malpractice Act, but I think Jensen

16

versus IHC is probably the one that deals with that —

17

guess I would call the pivotal issue; does the statute apply

18

here.

19

apply, then perhaps she's got an argument.

If it applies, it's just way too long.

what I

If it doesn't

The plaintiff cited no cases that said it didn't

20
21

apply.

There's just no authority at all to tell us why

22

alienation of affection should be treated differently than

23

wrongful death or fraud or anything else.

24

there are any cases.

25

those that we thought were most appropriate.

So I don't think

I couldn't find any cases.

We cited

-91

I'm happy to address the statute of repose if the

2

Court would like, but I don't think itfs necessary.

3

simply says that you have two years to file your lawsuit from

4

when you knew or should have known, but in no event do you get

5

more than four years from the date of the negligence.

That

In this

6 I case the negligence happened before January *96, when my client
7 I supposedly enticed the plaintiff's husband into bed.
8

years from January *96 is January 2000.

9

case any later than that under any circumstances.

10 j

Four

No way to bring the

Based on that we're, you know, we're prepared to

11 I submit it, unless you have some questions.
12 J

THE COURT: No, the only question I have is tangential.

13

That is as it relates to other defendants. This is Ms- Bullen's

14

motion for summary judgment.

15

MR. FERGUSON: Right.

16

THE COURT: And so we're not dealing with the other

17
18
19

defendants at this point; is

that right?

MR. FERGUSON: I think that's a fair statement.

To my

understanding none of the other defendants have been served.

20

THE COURT: Okay.

21

MR. FERGUSON: They're not really part of the case.

22 I They're named, but nothing's been done with respect to them.
23

They did not treat Ms. Bullen —

24

complaint are that they're a partnership somehow and liable for

25 I her conduct.

even the allegations of the

They're not a partnership, but none of that has

i\j.imu3
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-10really been developed, and they haven't been served and they're
not really before the Court.
THE COURT: Okay, and are you still wanting me to
consider the failure to prosecute under 41-B, that argument?
MR. FERGUSON: Only if you don't consider the statute
of limitations.

I think that the failure to prosecute in

well, let me back up.

—

Somewhere along the way I saw that there

had been an order to show cause in this case.
THE COURTJ Okay.
MR. FERGUSON: I was not aware of that, but I saw
the minutes from the clerk indicating that there had been
communication between Ms. McConkie and the clerk's office, and
that the Court had given additional time

—

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. FERGUSON: —

for discovery to be done, and when I

filed this motion including the failure to prosecute, I was not
aware of that order to show cause situation.

I think in light

of that, and in light of the Court's ruling on that order to
show cause, it doesn't make sense to pursue the failure to
prosecute.
THE COURT: Okay.

I appreciate that.

Thank you.

Would you like to respond, Ms. McConkie.
MS. McCONKIEr Thank you.

The alienation of affection

claim is not governed by the Healthcare Malpractice Act.
one reason because the defendant herself denied that the

For
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1

plaintiff was ever a patient of defendant/ and that you can

2

find in the answer to her complaint No. 9, 13, 16 and 19.

3 I

The idea behind the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act is

4

that it governs healthcare providers relating to —

or arriving

5

out of the health needs of their patients, and it doesn't

6 I really necessarily apply to nonpatients. Now, Ms. Bullen
7

herself has denied that there was ever a therapist/patient

8 I relationship between Suzanne Dowling and herself.
9

she has stated that she only treated the children.

10 I
11

In fact,

Because the defendant did not provide healthcare
services directly to the plaintiff, she can't claim the

12 J protection of the shorter statute of limitations as a
13 I procedural requirement of the Healthcare Malpractice Act.
14
15

To put it simply, even if Ms. Dowling did not know
that Ms. Bullen was a therapist, even if she were not a

16 I therapist, even if she didn't know her she would still have a
17 J relevant claim that she committed — to the extent that she
18

alienated the affections of Mr. Hoagland, Ms. Dowling's former

19

husband.

20 I
21

The reason why this case should not be dismissed
for failure to file from the statute of limitations is the

22 I statute of limitations for the tort of alienation of affection
23

is four years, and that's discussed in the Hodges v. Howe case.

24 I That case said the statute of limitations for alienation of
25

affection begins to run when alienation is accomplished, when

10012
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1

love and affection are finally lost.

2

The questionr then, is when the statute begins to run

3

or when the alienated spouse's affections are finally lost is

4

a question of fact.

5

Andreeny versus Hopefree that we cited.

6

that the time when the statute finally begins to run has been

7

defined at the point at which a person reasonably should have

8

known that he or she has suffered a legal injury.

9

It's not a question of law.

Now, we talk about th^ day.

That's the

The Andreeny case says

The divorce was granted

10

in September.

11

became aware of the cause of her husband's estrangement at that

12

time, and up until that time she was attempting to make every

13

effort to save her marriage.

14

So September 26^, 1996, but the plaintiff only

It was only after the plaintiff clearly understood

15

the defendant was involved in a romantic relationship with her

16

husband that she became aware that she suffered that legal

17

injury.

18

statute of limitations.

19

of 2000.

20

that.

21

It was —

and at that point she did file within the
She didn't file on September 26th

She actually filed on September 25th,

one day before

It is well settled that a tort cause of action are

22

proved when all of its elements come into being and the claim

23

of action and the defendant has conceded for purposes of this

24

motion plaintiff only became aware of the relationship between

25

her husband and herself in September of 1996, and you can find

-13that on their memorandum in support of Defendant Bullen's
motion for summary judgment of April, too.
In addition, there are factual disputes at issue.
Under Utah law a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's
actions were the controlling cause in the breakup of their
marriage.

That's in the Norton v. McFarland.
In that case the Court considered a complaint in which

the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's actions were the
controlling cause of the breakup of the marriage, and also that
the defendant abuse of special relationship between him and the
patient alienates the wife's affection.
Now, the Supreme Court reversed appellate Court
in that case, holding that these allegations along with the
existence of a special relationship were sufficient to succeed
a summary judgment motion.
So even in the absence of a special relationship
between the defendant and the spouse, a claim for alienation
of affection does apply.

However, the existence of a special

relationship if the facts —

or the finder of facts have

considered (inaudible) when the elements of the tort have
been proven.
So there are some issues that are in dispute there.
No. 1, was there a special relationship that existed between
the defendant and the plaintiff's husband; No. 2, if so whether
that relationship was controlling and was it the cause —

the

w

-14controlling cause of the breakup of the marriage; and No. 3,
was the defendant willfully and intentionally (inaudible)
alienated the affections of James Hoagland towards his wife.
These are all factual questions for a jury and are therefore
inappropriately decided upon a motion for summary judgment.
Now, we disagree with the assertions that defense made
that the Healthcare Malpractice Act protects all actions of
healthcare providers, because they only protect the actions of
those in the course of treatment.

Now, the core of defendant's

argument is that by virtue of the mere fact that defendant is
a healthcare provider she is shielded from all liability under
the Healthcare Malpractice Act.
Nowr under defendant's reading of the statute, any
healthcare provider would be protected by the two year statute
of limitations no matter what the tort.

Thus, under this

reading a doctor who dropped a medical dictionary on the toe
of his client would be —

the patient would be immune from

anything but the malpractice action simply by virtue that he is
a healthcare provider even if he dropped the book intentionally
from a five story window.

The same analysis of requiring

notice of intent to commence and action and a prelitigation
panel for doctors who intentionally punches a patient in the
face.
So defendant's reading of the statute, you read it
saying that every tort would be under the Medical Malpractice

-151

Act would give super status and extra protection simply by the

2

virtue of their occupation for medical provider.

3

interpretation a plaintiff who sues a doctor for damages based

4

on caused by the doctor's drunk driving would nevertheless need

Under this

5 I to request a prelitigation panel and comply with the other
6 I formalities of the act.
7

Clearly there are limits to the kinds of acts that

8

are protected under the malpractice statute, and a healthcare

9

provider is not immune from suit simply because of her status ,

10

but only when the actionr as the statute says, complained of

11

arises in the course of treatment,

12
13

Now, Ms. Bullen herself said that Ms, Dowling was not
a patient, and certainly even if we were to agree that we're

14 I taking —

in terms of the argument we're saying that she's not

15

her patient, but even if she were her patient, certainly would

16

the Court decide that an illicit affair was something that

17

occurred out of the course of the treatment between the

18

healthcare provider and the father of the patients —

19

the two daughters who were the patients in this matter.

of
I am

20 I unconvinced that the medical malpractice statute covers those
21
22

kinds of actions»
I would —

I appreciate the fact that the Court

23 J will not consider failure to prosecute.

I would just for

24

the information of the Court like to say that I did have a

25

discussion with Jay Jensen early on about doing a planning and

igjuie
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scheduling conference, and at that time he was going to file

2

an immediate motion to dismiss and we decided to wait until it

3

happened.

4

apparently hasn't been well and the case has had some delay in

5

getting reassigned.

6

that's what happened, Judge.

7

I made an attempt to contact him on that, and he

So just for the information of the Court,

The plaintiff's claim for alienation of affection was

8

filed within the four year statute when the plaintiff learned

9

that she'd suffered a legal injury.

Because Suzanne Dowling

10

was never a patient of the defendant, the Utah Healthcare

11

Malpractice Act does not apply in this case, and

12

the plaintiff's complaint specifically (inaudible) all of the

13

elements of alienation of affection, many of which are disputed

14

factual matters.

15

this motion —

16

Court should allow the plaintiff to prove each element at

17

trial.

Therefore, it would be inappropriate that

that this case should be dismissed, and the

Thank you.

18

THE COURT: Let me ask you two questions if I could.

19

MS. McCONKIE: Uh-huh.

20

THE COURT: Based upon the fact that you're arguing the

21

alienation of affection cause of action/ are you conceding that

22

the other causes of action are going to fall by the wayside

23

because there's a statute of limitations?

24
25

MS. McCONKIE: I think that the other causes of action
are going to fall by the wayside.

-17THE COURT: Okay, and the second thing, second question
that I had is I don't remember seeing in the summary judgment
pleadings that I reviewed any issue about whether or not there
was a therapist/patient relationship.

I thought there was some

mention that the whole family was involved in therapy at some
point.
MS, McCONKIEs Well, what happened was that there
had been some difficulty in the family, there had been some
stress in the family.

The family had decided to come because

of Mr. Hoagland's anger problems and because the children were
stressed and I think probably because there was marital stress,
and they brought the children in to see Ms. Bullen.
Now, initially my client assumed because she sat

—

she did sit in on a number of those, and so did Mr. Hoagland,
but my client never received therapy from —
from Ms. Bullen.

individually

In fact, Ms. Bullen herself denied that she

ever had a patient/therapist relationship.

I think my client

believes what maybe there might have been a patient/therapist
relationship, but for purposes of this argument we're saying we
don't think there was.

So therefore she denied it.

THE COURT: Well, and understand, if you will, the only
thing —

the only record that I have at this point is what's

contained in the file.

So where would I look in the pleadings

to find what's disputed or not relative to that,
MS. McCONKIE: Well, her denial was in her answer,

m

-18paragraph 9, which my notes say 9, 13, 16 and 19.

Let me grab

that.
THE COURT: Okay, and then where do I look in the memo?
MS. McCONKIE: Oh, excuse me.
page 2, I believe.

The memorandum was on

The memorandum in support of Defendant

Bullen's motion for summary judgment, page 2, but I think that
had to do, your Honor, with when defendant conceded for the
purpose of the motion that the plaintiff became aware of the
relationship between her husband and the defendant.
MR. FERGUSON; I think I made —
2

my opening memo, page

—
THE COURT: I think that's where I was looking, but
MR. FERGUSON: —

undisputed facts.

—

paragraph 5 of the statement of

^Plaintiff alleges that both she and the

then husband were in individual therapy with Ms. Bullen, an
allegation which Ms. Bullen denies, complained in paragraphs
13 and 19.

However, for purposes of this motion for summary

judgment only, Ms. Bullen does not dispute this allegation."
THE COURT: Okay.
Ms. McConkie, did I —

Thank you for helping me find that.

was there anything else you needed to

add?
MS. McCONKIE: No.
THE COURT; Okay, thank you.

Rebuttal?

So where does

that leave me with regard to whether or not there is a disputed
fact of therapist/patient relationship?

4£J

-19MR- FERGUSON: First time Ifve heard it.

I don't think

it's a disputed fact for purposes of this motion.

If you look

at the complaint, at those paragraphs 13 and 19, it's pretty
clear that Ms. Dowling alleges that she was in therapy with
Ms. Bullen.

She says, * m late %94 Dowling's family members

began counseling sessions with Bullen in order to work through
personal problems."
"Dowling along with her family attended numerous
counseling sessions with Bullen.

In December

X

9A — * and

presumably later than late %94, but I don't know —
two daughters began counseling with Bullen.

^Dowling's

In February *95

Dowling along with their two daughters and James began family
counseling with Bullen.

As a result of Bullen's position as a

counselor, Bullen occupied a special position of trust in the
eyes of plaintiff.

The family or various members of the family

attended counseling with Bullen until June of *96."
I don't know how it could be any plainer than that.
She's alleging that Ms. Bullen was her therapist and Ms, Bullen
breached the therapy relationship with her by disclosing her
confidences, by inflicting negli —

or negligently inflicting

emotional distress, and by breaching the code of ethics which
does prohibit sexual relations between therapists and patients«
The summary judgment motion is directed at the
allegations of the complaint, and if it's the case that
Ms. Bullen —

or that Ms. Dowling is not claiming —

is not

I£)0

-20going to sue Ms, Bullen for being her therapist and for
committing malpractice during the therapy, then there's no
lawsuit.

There's nothing for us to fight about.

So either

she is the therapist and she filed too late, or she's not the
therapist and has no duty.
both of those paths.

It can't be both.

She can't walk

They're different paths.

So for Ms, McConkie now to stand up and sayf *Wellf
we're going to take the allegations of the answer instead of
the complaint," and say there's an issue of fact I think
ignores the whole crux of the motion for summary judgment,
which is to say, *Let's assume your complaint's true.
filed it too late.

You

You can't bring the claim."

There's also a couple of other issues that I think
need to be clarified.

An alienation of affections claim does

not begin to run when a person discovers a legal injury.
is a medical malpractice statute requirement.

That

It is not a

requirement for the beginning of a statute of limitations on
alienation of affections.
There is no case law and no statute that gives the
plaintiff the right to postpone filing an alienation of
affections claim until she discovers her legal injury.

She's

confusing the medical malpractice statute with the garden
variety catchall statute.

They are different/ and it's the

medical malpractice statute that gives the plaintiff the
benefit of waiting until the legal injury is discovered.

*++.m\\/*j
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So her argument that she didn't discover her legal

2 I injury either means that she recognizes its governed by the
3

medical malpractice statute, or she has no right to claim legal

4

injury.

I mean, you canft do both of those.

5

The other issue that I think is confused is that

6 I Ms. Dowling is basing her argument on when she concluded there
7

was no hope in saving the marriage.

8

of affections claim.

9

affection that is the basis of an alienation of affections

10

claim.

That is not an alienation

It's the alienation of her husband's

Not the alienation of Ms. Dowling's affections.

11 I

When Ms. Dowling concluded that her marriage was

12 I beyond repair, that she couldn't survive in that marriage is
13

irrelevant.

14

was no longer any value to the marriage.

15
16

The issue is when did James conclude that there

THE COURT: But either way isn't that when the decree
was entered?

17

MR. FERGUSON: Well, you could certainly make that

18 I argument, but I think the stronger argument is when he filed
19 I the petition for divorce, which was in January
20

%

96, nine months

earlier.

21

The effort to try and create issues of fact about the

22

merits of the alienation of affections claim also misses the

23

point.

24

from suit for alienation of affections.

25

you're going to sue her for alienation of affection, you have

We don't stand here and say that Ms. Bullen is immune
We simply say that if
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to do it within two years, which she didn't do.

So now it's

2 I too late.
3

There's no issue of immunity.

There's no argument

4

that doctors get away with certain torts that the rest of the

5

world doesn't get away with.

6

the healthcare malpractice statute makes some statutes of

7

limitation longer.

8

The fact of the matter is that

For example, intentional torts.

The example put by

9

Ms- McConkie of a doctor throwing a book at the patient would

10

normally be governed by a one year statute of limitations, but

11

under the Medical Malpractice Act it's two years.

12

alienation of affections claim which normally might be four

13

years under the Medical Malpractice Act is shortened to two.

14

Likewise an

The point that's discussed in the Jensen case is

15

that the legislature wanted to make claims against healthcare

16

providers uniform.

17

a wide variety of contracts, wide variety of warranty issues,

18

all of which have different statutes of limitations and the

19

legislature said,

20

going to make them all fit within this two-year statute.

21

two years from when you knew or should have known.'' Because of

22

that, you get two years on an alienation of affections claim.

23

That's the thrust of the Jensen holding.

24
25

There's a wide variety of torts, there's

xx

We're going to simplify that, and we're

I think it's fair to say that there probably are
some factual questions that relate to whether there was an

It's

l£j

-23alienation of affections.
to anything.

Certainly Ms. Bullen doesn't admit

She thinks Ms. Dowling is completely wrong, but

for purposes of the summary judgment motion, we simply sayr
^Let's assume it's all true.
didn't.

Did you file on time?"

No, you

So the case has to be dismissed.
Unless the Court has additional questions, and if I

can clarify anything else for you, I'll sit down and shut up.
THE COURT: Okay.

I think you've both answered all my

questions and I appreciate you both coming in today so that I
could ask them.

I'm going to review the Jensen case, and I'll

issue a written ruling as soon as I can,
MS. McCONKIE: Your Honor, would you like me -- would
you like the cases of alienation of affection statute, would
you like me to copy them?
THE COURT: I do have copies of all of the cases.

I

just didn't have a chance to review them before I came into
Court today.

Thanksr though.

brief recess.
(Hearing concluded.)

Thanks, Counsel.

We'll be in a
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That certain parties were not identified in the
record, and therefore, the name associated with the
statement may not be the correct name as to the speaker.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 4th day of June 2002.
My commission expires:
February 24, 2004
Beverly Lowe
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Utah County

BEVERLY A. LOWE
WWIWUC'STATEMM
1771 SOUTH CALIFORNIA AVE
PROVO.UT 84606
COMM. EXP 2-24-2004

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SUZANNE DOWLXNG, fka
SUZANNE HOAGLAND,

:

MINUTE ENTRY

t

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 000907667

vs.
•

KATHLEEN BULLEN, TROLLEY CORNERS
FAMILY THERAPY CLINIC, a
:
general partnership, CANYON RIM
PSYCHOTHERAPY, and John Does
:
1 through 20,
:

Defendants.

Before the Court is defendant Bullenfs Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The Court having heard oral argument of counsel and

having further reviewed the pleadings filed in this matter, now
enters the following ruling.
The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

All

of the allegations in the plaintiff• s Complaint arise out of the
plaintifffs claim that defendant Bullen committed malpractice in
the course of treatment of various members of plaintiff's family.
The applicable statute of limitations therefor is contained within
the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, which provides a statute of
limitations of two years.
more

than

two years

It is clear that this action was filed

after plaintiff

discovered

the

injury.

Although plaintiff argues that no therapist/patient relationship

DOWLING V. BULLEN
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existed, for the purposes of this Summary Judgment the record
indicates that such a relationship existed.
Based upon that, the Court grants the defendant's Summary
Judgment Motion and directs counsel for defendant Bullen to prepare
an Order consistent with this ruling.
Dated this"^

day of October, 2001.

\£)f^JL>< oJ^Jz
SANDRA N. PEULER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the above and
foregoing Brief of Appellants and placed the same in the U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid, first class mail on this 3
day of June, 2002.
Phillip S. Ferguson
Christensen & Jensen
50 South Main Street, 1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84144

Kathleen McConkie, Esq.

